The Poverty and Inequality research cluster, part of the Vulnerability and Poverty Reduction team at IDS, produces research on poverty, inequality and wellbeing. Our research challenges orthodox views on the nature of poverty, how poverty is understood and how policy can best accelerate poverty reduction. Our work focuses on poverty and wellbeing through the lens of equity and inequality. Poverty is not only about 'poor' people but also about the social and economic inequalities that compound and reproduce poverty.
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Introduction
This paper asks the following question: Does the shift in global poverty towards middle-income countries (MICs) mean that global poverty is becoming a matter of national inequality? This paper argues that many of the world's extreme poor already live in countries where the total cost of ending extreme poverty is not prohibitively high as a percentage of GDP. And in the not-too-distant future, most of the world's poor will live in countries that do have the domestic financial scope to end at least extreme poverty.
1
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 discusses concepts of absolute and relative 'poor' countries to assess if MICs are 'poor' countries and if so, in what sense. Section 2 focuses on the cost of ending poverty in middle-income countries and section 3 on trends in inequality, the number of 'non-poor' people, and presents a scenarios-based approach to the evolution of global poverty to 2020 and 2030. Section 4 concludes.
Absolute and relative 'poor' countries
The majority of the world's poor, by income and multi-dimensional poverty measures, live in countries classified by the World Bank as middle-income countries (Alkire et al. 2011; Chandy and Gertz 2011; Glassman et al. 2011; Sumner 2011a, 2011b; Koch 2011; Sumner 2010 Sumner , 2012a 2012b) . Such patterns matter beyond the thresholds of low-income countries and middle-income countries (LICs/MICs) set by the World Bank, because they reflect a pattern of rising average incomes and although the thresholds do not mean a sudden change in countries when a line is crossed in per capita income, substantially higher levels of average per capita income imply substantially more domestic resources available for poverty reduction.
If most of the world's poor live in (lower) MICs, one question that follows is: to what extent are these 'poor' countries and/or 'poor' countries in relation to what? Dudley Seers (1963) provided the seminal discussion of developed country characteristics, and their divergence from the characteristics of developing countries. On this basis he could justify calling the developed, or industrialised, countries 'a special case' of 'a few countries with highly unusual, not to say peculiar, characteristics ' (p80) . This is in contrast to developing countries, for whom,
[t]he typical case is a largely unindustrialised economy, the foreign trade of which consists essentially in selling primary products for manufactures. There are about 100 identifiable economies of this sort, covering the great majority of the world's population (p80). Seers (1963: 81-83) identified the characteristic features of the 'special case' or advanced economies in 'note form' including, for example, factors of production (e.g. literacy and the mobility of labour), sectors of the economy (e.g. manufacturing much larger than either agriculture or mining), public finance (e.g. reliance on direct taxes), households (e.g. very few below subsistence level and a moderately equal distribution of income), savings and investment (e.g. well-developed financial intermediaries), and 'dynamic influences' (e.g. slow population growth and high urbanisation).
One could conceptualise 'poor' countries in various ways. Table A3 for population coverage by indicator and group).
In absolute terms, the group averages for LMICs suggest average per capita PPP income at almost five times the higher international poverty line of $2. In relative terms, the average for the LMIC group is considerably higher than the average income of the LIC group -which itself is barely above the higher international poverty line. Average per capita income in the LMIC group is typically three times the level of LICs and, notably, GDP per capita by PPP is approaching $10 per person/day (see Table 1 .2 below).
Overall, levels of extreme poverty as a percentage of population are lower in the LMIC group average compared to the LIC average (see Table 1 This discussion is -evidently -overly focused on economic development. One could pursue further dimensions of development such as governance and sustainability amongst others (see for discussion Gentilini and Sumner, 2012) . 
The relative cost of ending poverty
Even if most of the world's poor live in countries that are not the poorest countries, nor absolutely 'poor' countries, nor aid-dependent, the cost of ending poverty may be of a size relative to GDP that means it is unlikely poverty can be fully addressed via domestic resources. In short, one could consider whether countries are 'poor' relative to the capacity to end poverty (see discussion in Kanbur and Mukherjee 2007) , expressed as the cost of ending poverty as percentage of GDP. This then estimates the 'transfer' necessary as a percentage of GDP from the non-poor to the poor to end poverty.
Using such an approach, absolute and relative poor countries might be estimated by a threshold -with absolute poor countries needing perhaps more than 2 per cent of GDP to close the poverty gap, and relative poor countries requiring 1-2 per cent on the basis that the average for military spending is, respectively, 1.6 per cent and 2.2 per cent in the LIC and LMIC groupings (estimated from data in WDI, World Bank,2011b) , where most of the world's poor live and military spending is a crude proxy for alternative uses of resources.
Tables 2.1 to 2.4 present data on the total poverty gap as a percentage of GDP. Data is presented in PPP constant 2005 international dollars to be comparable with later estimates on the poverty gap in 2020 and 2030. In the LMICs, the group average for the cost of ending poverty is 1.3 per cent of GDP PPP for $1.25 poverty, but 5.5 per cent for $2 poverty (compared to 8.4 per cent and 25.4 per cent respectively for LICs).
Seventeen MICs have a total poverty gap of greater than 1 per cent of GDP (PPP$, constant 2005 international $), ranging up to 12.8 per cent in Zambia (See Table  2 .2). When the data for the 20 countries with 90 per cent of world poverty are considered, many of the countries which have particularly high costs of ending $1.25 (and $2) poverty as a proportion of GDP are LICs, such as Bangladesh, the DRC, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique and Malawi. That said, MICs like Nigeria, Angola and Nepal in that list of twenty countries also have high costs of ending poverty (see Table 2 .3). One can go further and estimate 'bands' of the cost of ending $1.25 poverty and $2 poverty (see Table 2 .4). This splits the world's $1.25 poor between countries that have a cost of ending poverty of more than 2 per cent of GDP, and countries that have a cost of ending $1.25 poverty of less than 2 per cent. However, when $2 poverty is considered, 80 per cent of the world's poor live in countries where the cost of ending $2 poverty would be more than 3 per cent of GDP.
If most of the world's poor lived in countries with the domestic financial capacity to end at least extreme poverty, extreme poverty would be a matter of national distribution and domestic political economy (for example, via the redistributive preferences of the middle classes and elites). This would imply the need for a fundamental reframing of global poverty as largely a matter of domestic distribution. Source: Data processed from WDI (World Bank, 2011b) and PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012) . Note: * = The poverty data listed in PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012) for these countries in 2008 appears lower than one might expect suggesting caution (see also discussion in Sumner, 2012b) and for rates by national poverty lines see Gentilini and Sumner (2012) . Kuznets (1955; argued, in his presidential address to the 1954 American Economic Association and in later articles, a relationship based on a 'hypothetical numerical exercise' of which Kuznets noted 5% was empirical information and 95% was speculation. Kuznets postulated an inverted U shape relationship between income and inequality. Kuznets predicted an increase in inequality in the early stages of development and a reduction in inequality in subsequent periods. This was formulated using the Lewis dual economy model. 2 Kuznets argued that agricultural economies (i.e. developing countries) are initially relatively equal societies with low average income. As the economy develops, the population migrates to non-agricultural sectors, where average incomes are higher, as is inequality. Thus initially, inequality worsens because of the higher proportion of national income in the industrial sector and the higher proportion of profits in national income. The early benefits of economic growth go to those with control over capital and better education. In time, as more of the population move out of the traditional, rural, agricultural sector to the modern, urban, industrial sector and real wages in industry begin to rise, income inequality decreases. What Kuznets implied on the inequality-togrowth linkage was that there is a trade off: inequality is a short-term price worth paying for long-term economic development and that growth would eventually lead mechanistically to poverty reduction through the 'trickle down' effect.
There has been a wide range of research pursuing these questions (see review in Sumner and Tiwari, 2009) . The sum of which is as follows: Economic growth can impact on inequality through various channels including modification to the distribution of resources across sectors, relative prices, factor rewards and factor endowments. However, there are too many country specifics to make a generalization and the quality and availability of inequality data constrain the ability to make definitive statements. 3 If one focuses on the share of GNI to the poorest (the poorest 20% or poorest 40%), the country group averages in LICs, LMICs and UMICs are thought provoking:
The pattern that emerges when one considers the data without India and without China is that the share of GNI to the poorest 20 percent or poorest 40 percent of the population declines as countries get better off and carries on declining.
The share of GNI to the poorest 20 percent or 40 percent of population is highest in LICs and lowest in UMICs if one considers the data without India in the LMICs and without China in the UMICs group (see table 3.1).
At the same time the share of GNI of the richest decile rises as one moves from the LICs to LMICs without India. The share of the rich then drastically rises as one moves from considering LMICs without India to the UMICs without China (see also later discussion).
This and the 'capture' of about half of GNI in the middle deciles (decile 5-decile 9) in LICs, LMICs and UMICs corroborates Palma's (2011) 'homogeneous middles, heterogeneous tails' thesis (see below) that the middle classes always capture half of GNI and politics is about the contest between the rich and the poor for the rest. 3 .2). In those countries, the share of GNI to the poorest four deciles is, in general, static or declining when 1990 and 2008 are compared (using nearest available survey data).
However, five of the 15 countries are experiencing an increased share of GNI to the poorest 40 per cent by more than 2 percentage points (Pakistan, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Brazil and Nepal). In parallel, the share of the richest decile is static or rising in most countries, with more or less the same set of exceptions -Pakistan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Brazil and Nepal. Palma (2011) noted that the share of GNI to those who are neither extremely poor (which he defines as the poorest four expenditure deciles), nor rich (defined as the richest expenditure decile), is surprisingly similar, at about 50 per cent of GNI, regardless of where (and when) one looks at the distribution data (see table 3.3).
In short, there is a remarkable capture of half of GNI by those deciles between the poor and the rich. This suggests that, as Palma (2011) argues, domestic politics is about a contest for the remaining 50 per cent of GNI between the very rich and the very poor. Palma (2011) argued that, in light of the observation that the share of GNI of those people in deciles D5-D9 is generally half of national income, the 'middle classes' should be renamed the 'median classes':
Basically, it seems that a schoolteacher, a junior or mid-level civil servant, a young professional (other than economics graduates working in financial markets), a skilled worker, middle-manager or a taxi driver who owns his or her own car, all tend to earn the same income across the world -as long as their incomes are normalized by the income per capita of the respective country. (Palma 2011: 102) It is worth remembering, as noted above, that the amount of redistribution required to end extreme ($1.25/day) poverty can be quite low in some middle-income countries. Ravallion (2010) has argued that most countries with an average per capita PPP income of over $4,000 would require very small additional taxation to end poverty. that the MTRs necessary to end poverty are high in many of the 'new MICs' (in contrast, many 'old' MICs would require MTRs of under 10 per cent to end poverty). This is particularly due to large populations of poor relative to the number of 'rich' people in many new MICs. If the scope for domestic taxes is insufficient, access to aid may still be important in middle-income countries, for the near future at least. Further, Cardenas et al. (2011: 19) are sceptical of tax rises for the middle classes based on the attitudes expressed in the World Values Survey for Peru:
the status quo in many Latin American countries is a very low level of income taxation for the middle classes. Given their attitudes and political say, it is very unlikely that the expansion of the middle class will result in greater levels of personal income taxation. This is the main difference in tax structures compared to the developed world.
OECD (2011a) discusses in some considerable detail middle class preferences for the amount of income redistribution via fiscal policy notably what middle class households gain and the quality of public services. 5 Other factors that determine preferences to redistribution are noted from the literature, including: personal experiences of social mobility (Piketty 1995) , national and regional cultural and social values (Alesina and Giuliano 2009) , the extent of impacts of (higher) taxation on leisure consumption (Meltzer and Richards 1981) , levels of university education (Daude and Melguizo 2010; Torgler 2005) , and attitudes to prevailing levels of meritocracy (Alesina and Angeletos 2005) . It is also noted that support for redistribution is undermined by low institutional capacity in tax administration, the quality of state services, and pessimistic views over social mobility (Gaviria 2007; Torgler 2005) .
In short, the capacity to redistribute and the preferences of the non-poor for redistributive policies may become increasingly important for poverty reduction in middle-income countries. However, if there is little support amongst the more secure middle classes for paying more taxes, such policies will be constrained by political economy factors. This will be made worse if the lower 'middle millions' are only just above extreme poverty.
The number of 'non-poor' people in the world (here meaning those above $2/day) has risen significantly since 1990, as a proportion of the population and in absolute numbers (see Table 3 .4 and Appendix 3). There has been a particularly notable expansion between $2-$4/day and $4-$10/day. Across all developing countries the proportion of people in the $2-$10 group has risen from about a quarter to almost a half. When the data is analysed without China the rise is less pronounced but still significant. The rises are particularly noticeable in the new MIC group, but visible in the data across both LMIC and UMIC groups. The actual numbers of people (see data in appendix 3) in the $2-$4 range have risen from 700m to 1.4bn, and in the $4-$10 range from 400m to 1.1bn, across In sum, the net effect of fiscal policy for middlesector families, while marginally positive, is not large, and they benefit most from in-kind services such as education and health care… [However] , if these services are of low quality, the middle sector is more likely to consider itself a loser in the fiscal bargain and less willing to contribute to financing of the public sector.' developing countries between 1990 and 2008. The rises are less pronounced without China but still entail a near doubling in the number of people in both the $2-$4/day and $4-$10/day group; so that there are now around 2 billion people under $2/day globally excluding China, 1bn in the $2-$4 range, and 720m in the $4-$10 range. The rise in numbers of people is, as noted above, particularly noticeable in the new MIC group but also crosses both LMIC and UMIC groups.
As countries get richer in per capita income, on average individual taxes as a proportion of GDP rise (see Table 3 .5). As people's expenditures rise above $2/day their consumption patterns change, resulting in an increasing exposure to indirect and sales taxes, and perhaps formal (and informal) payments for business licenses (although possibly not income taxes if they are in the informal sector). 6 This has the potential to change perceptions of the relationship between the state and the individual.
Recent empirical evidence for this is provided by Devarajan et al. (2011: 15) , who identify that there is a positive relationship, significant at 1 per cent, between the level of tax revenue and the extent of voice and accountability in a country (using Kaufmann governance indicators for voice and accountability); but that there is a threshold at 49 per cent of GDP after which, with excessively high levels of taxation, the relationship is inverted. As the authors note (p15), 'Since the tax-to-GDP ratio in most developing countries is below this level, one can assume that most of them are situated on the rising part of the relationship where increases in the level of taxation are associated with more accountability.' Interestingly, Devarajan et al. (2011: 13) also note that governance and education have a strong association even after controlling for various variables. Table 3 .5 shows that, as average income rises, total tax as a proportion of GDP rises; as does individual income tax, corporate tax and tax on goods and services. And at the same time as average income rises, aid is becoming less and less significant as a proportion of GNI in new MICs. There is thus a shift from external funding in the form of aid towards non-aid and domestic sources from taxation; hypothetically, this implies a shift in accountability from state-to-donors to state-todomestic tax payers (and/or natural resource incomes) (see Brautigam et al. 2008; Moore 2007) . One position to take is that there is little need to worry about the poor in MICs because growth will end poverty in the near future. How reasonable is this argument? Conceptually, the poor in middle-income countries could be disconnected from a country's growth due to spatial inequality or remoteness. The poor may also be relatively voiceless in domestic governance structures and potentially discriminated against in public services and public spending allocations regionally. And intra-country migration may be hindered or constrained by cost and administrative regulations.
One way to explore the question is to estimate poverty in the future by different scenarios in order to assess if poverty in MICs will be easily addressed by growth in those countries which are currently LMICs. This can be done by drawing upon an approach taken by Moss and Leo (2011) and Santos and Sumner (2012, forthcoming) and Karver et al. (2012, forthcoming) Two essential caveats must be noted: First, such projections are an inherently imprecise exercise that merely illustrates possible future scenarios (See also discussion in Kanbur and Sumner, 2011; Karver et al. 2012, forthcoming and Williams, 2001) . Second, the approach likely over-states poverty reduction in fast growing economies such as lower MICs because it assumes static inequality in countries that are rapidly growing (which the discussion earlier suggest this is questionable and inequality can move both ways).
Even so, the data suggests that the remaining $1.25 and $2 poverty in those countries that are currently MICs will remain half of all world poverty in 2020 and 2030 (see table 3.6).
And given that some countries that are currently LICs will move into the LMIC category this suggests the structure of world poverty will remain split between LICs and MICs (see Table 3 .6). Geographically, the data suggests poverty will be increasingly focused in Sub-Saharan Africa.
As GDP rises the cost of ending poverty as a proportion of domestic GDP will (likely) fall, and poverty will become increasingly about national distribution, with the potential exception of some countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The projections for 2020 and 2030 show that the number of LICs in 2020 could be in the range of 24 to 30, and in 2030 from 16 to 28 compared to the current 35 LICs (see Table 3 .7 and Appendix 4).
For ease of discussion here, and because of its consistency with the IMF's historic overestimation of growth prospects, the moderate scenario is used here in the text (see Appendix 4 for data for all scenarios) and the discussion largely focuses on $2 poverty, as by 2030 the international poverty line will presumably be adjusted closer to $2. Further, $2 is the median poverty line for all developing countries (Chen and Ravallion 2008; 2012) . Data for $1.25 poverty is also presented for comparison. Taking the moderate growth scenario, in 2020, poverty will be largely split as follows: 60 per cent in countries that are currently MICs (in 2010), and 40 per cent in countries which are currently LICs in 2010. In 2030, global poverty will be split more evenly between countries that are currently LICs and countries that are currently MICs (see Table 3 .6 and Appendix 4).
This suggests that even if inequality does not rise, poverty will remain an issue for MICs and of course as noted a number of the countries that are currently LICs will be MICs by then too.
It also suggests the cost to end poverty will be minimal for those countries that are currently LMICs and UMICs as a percentage of GDP (see table 3.8).
Although the cost in those countries that are currently LICs of ending $2 poverty would be 15 per cent of GDP in 2020, this falls to under 10 per cent of GDP in 2030. This suggests for a small number of countries (20 LICs in this moderate scenario) external support for poverty reduction will remain absolutely essential. However, in those countries that are currently LMICs the cost of ending $2 poverty will be just 1.2 per cent of GDP in 2020 and 0.6 per cent in 2030 and negligible in those countries that are currently UMICs. Tanzania and Kenya and one country that is currently a LMIC but projected to be a LIC in 2030: Yemen However, one should remember the caveats noted above -that this endeavour of making projections for income/expenditure poverty is an inherently imprecise exercise that merely illustrates possible future scenarios.
In terms of other dimensions of poverty such as education, nutrition and health in particular, historical trends can be used to produce approximations for 2030 with a greater level of reliability (see Karver, Kenny and Sumner, 2012, forthcoming) .
Conclusions
In 1990, approximately 90 per cent of the world's poor people (by both $1.25 and $2 international poverty lines) lived in low-income countries, where the average PPP per capita income was barely above the higher international poverty line -and thus addressing 'global poverty' was framed largely around international redistribution via aid. In 2008, 70-80 per cent of the world's poor people (respectively, by the $1.25 and $2 international poverty lines) lived in middle-income countries. In the LMIC group, the average PPP per capita income for the group was approximately five times the higher international poverty line. This raises the question of whether 'global poverty' requires reframing as a national distribution issue in a world of fewer and fewer aid dependent countries, either now or at some point in the foreseeable future.
Absolute income thresholds for country classification mean income growth will always imply a transition of the poor from LICs to MICs unless poverty falls drastically in absolute numbers during the transition. Does it then follow that poverty becomes a domestic issue related to national inequality? It depends on the country and the growth experience. It is likely that different countries are experiencing different trajectories -based on the evolution of population growth, income growth, inequality and the poverty gap. One might suggest that there are two stylised groups of country evident if one considers a matrix of 2 x 2 with 'equitable growth' (here defined as the incomes of the poor rising in line with average income) and the 'poverty gap' as the key variables.
Group 1 countries are those with healthy and relatively equitable growth, and a low poverty gap as a percentage of GDP. In this group, the costs of poverty reduction are within domestic financial capacity.
Group 2 countries are those with more unequal growth and larger poverty gaps; which may attain MIC status in terms of mean income but do not yet have the domestic financial fiscal means to address poverty despite higher average incomes. For Group 1, the issue is one of domestic redistribution.
Group 1 may be largely concentrated in parts of Latin America and East Asia. Group 2 may be largely concentrated in India and sub-Saharan Africa. Looking ahead to 2020 and 2030, as average incomes rise, more and more of the world's poor will live in Group 1 countries, and poverty will increasingly become a matter of national inequality.
This might imply that a fundamental reframing of global poverty is approaching; 'traditional aid' (meaning resource transfer) is of limited relevance, and the core variable to explain global poverty is increasingly national distribution and thus national political economy. Sources: Data estimates derived be using method of Karver et al. (2012, forthcoming) and processed from PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012) and WEO (IMF, 2012) based on static inequality.
Appendix 3: Inequality data

